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Abstract
We tested the proposition that when eyewitnesses find it difficult to recognize a suspect (as in a culprit-absent
showup), eyewitnesses accept a weaker match to memory for making an identification. We tie this proposition
to the basic recognition memory literature, which shows people use lower decision criteria when recognition
is made difficult so as to not miss their chance of getting a hit on the target. We randomly assigned
participant–witnesses (N = 610) to a condition in which they were told that if they did not believe the suspect
was the culprit, they would have additional opportunities to make an identification later (additional-
opportunities instruction). We fully crossed this instruction with the standard admonition (i.e., the culprit
may or may not be present) and with the presence or absence of the culprit in a showup identification
procedure. The standard admonition had no impact on eyewitness decision-making; however, the additional-
opportunities instruction reduced innocent-suspect identifications (from 33% to 15%) to a greater extent than
culprit identifications (57% to 51%). The additional-opportunities instruction yielded a better tradeoff
between culprit and innocent-suspect identifications as indicated by binary logistic regression and receiver
operator characteristic (ROC) analyses.
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Abstract 
We tested the proposition that when eyewitnesses find it difficult to recognize a suspect 
(as in a culprit-absent showup), eyewitnesses accept a weaker match-to-memory for 
making an identification. We tie this proposition to the basic recognition memory 
literature, which shows people use lower decision criteria when recognition is made 
difficult so as to not miss their chance of getting a hit on the target.  We randomly 
assigned participant-witnesses (N = 610) to a condition in which they were told that if 
they did not believe the suspect was the culprit, they would have additional opportunities 
to make an identification later (additional-opportunities instruction). We fully crossed 
this instruction with the standard admonition (i.e., the culprit may-or-may-not be present) 
and with the presence or absence of the culprit in a showup identification procedure. The 
standard admonition had no impact on eyewitness decision-making; however, the 
additional-opportunities instruction reduced innocent-suspect identifications (from 33% 
to 15%) to a greater extent than culprit identifications (57% to 51%). The additional-
opportunities instruction yielded a better tradeoff between culprit and innocent-suspect 
identifications as indicated by binary logistic regression and Receiver Operator 
Characteristic (ROC) analyses.  
Keywords: Eyewitness Decision-Making; Present/Absent Criteria Discrepancy; Showups; 
Signal Detection Theory; Decision Criterion 
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Public Significance Statement: We told some eyewitness-participants that if they did not 
believe the suspect in a show-up was the culprit, they would have additional opportunities 
to identify someone later. This instruction decreased mistaken identifications more than it 
reduced accurate identifications. This finding and its theoretical underpinnings shows 
new promise for pre-identification instructions that can increase the reliability of 
eyewitness identification evidence.  
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Eyewitness Identification Performance on Showups Improves with an Additional-
Opportunities Instruction: Evidence for Present/Absent Criteria Discrepancy 
Based on reviews of data on pre-lineup instructions, it has been argued that an 
instruction admonition (that the culprit might not be in the lineup) reduces mistaken 
identifications at a greater rate than it reduces culprit identifications, thereby resulting in 
an overall improvement in performance (Steblay, 1997, 2013).  Clark (2005), however, 
argued that finding an improvement in performance from instructions could not be 
reconciled with Signal Detection Theory (Green & Swets, 1966; Macmillan & Creelman, 
2005). Clark (2005) argued that instructions could only produce an equal tradeoff in 
culprit and innocent suspect identifications. Clark’s (2005) logic is that instructions 
influence the tendency for an eyewitness to make an identification (response bias), but 
not the ability of an eyewitness to distinguish between guilty and innocent persons 
(discriminability). Because instructions should only influence response bias, Clark (2005) 
reasoned that, when measured by statistics that are independent of response bias (e.g., the 
discriminability index or d΄) instructions could only produce a tradeoff between culprit 
and innocent-suspect identifications.  
We propose, however, that an instruction can improve performance as measured 
by d΄ (or the area under the ROC curve, AUC) in an eyewitness identification task. In the 
present experiment, we test this proposition with a novel instruction admonishing 
eyewitnesses that if they do not believe the suspect is the culprit they will have additional 
opportunities to make an identification later. We fully crossed this instruction with the 
presence and absence of the culprit in a showup identification procedure and with a 
standard admonition informing the eyewitness that the culprit may or may not be present. 
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Hereafter, we will argue that eyewitnesses who encounter innocent suspects tend 
to require a weaker match-to-memory for positive identification (i.e., adopt a lower 
decision criterion) than do eyewitnesses who encounter guilty suspects. We refer to this 
as present/absent criteria discrepancy theory. To be clear from the outset, it is not our 
contention that eyewitnesses knowingly lower their criteria for identification because 
they are aware that the suspect is innocent. Rather, when eyewitnesses lower their 
decision criteria, they do so because they find the recognition task difficult or because 
match-to-memory is weak. Because innocent suspects tend to provide a worse match-to-
memory than do guilty suspects, eyewitnesses who encounter innocent suspects might 
have a tendency to find the recognition task more difficult and to lower their criteria in 
response to this increased task difficulty. 
Although it is generally the case that instructions affect only decision criteria and 
not discriminability, eyewitness identification tasks have a property that does not 
characterize any of the extant literature and methods typically used with Signal Detection 
Theory. Specifically, perception and memory studies routinely present each participant 
with a large number of trials (dozens or sometimes hundreds) in which the signal is 
present on some trials and absent on other trials. In other words, the routine method in the 
basic recognition and perception literatures involves using a repeated-measures task in 
which each participant is exposed to a randomly-ordered sequence of signal-present and 
signal-absent test trials. This is very unlike an eyewitness identification experiment in 
which the participant is tested with a single trial in which the target-present versus target-
absent factor is manipulated between participants. In other words, in a standard 
eyewitness identification study, each eyewitness is nested completely in either a signal-
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present trial or a signal-absent trial and never experiences the other state of the world. 
Other than eyewitness identification experiments, we can think of no other type of 
cognitive psychology experiment that has the property of nesting the participant in a 
single-trial task in which the signal is either present or absent.  
This distinction between a basic perception/memory experiment using within-
participant, repeated-measure designs, over a large number of signal-present and signal-
absent trials versus an eyewitness identification experiment in which the participant is 
tested once using either a signal-present or a signal-absent trial is potentially very 
important. In fact, in standard signal detection experiments, discriminability and response 
bias are calculated individually for each participant and these values become the unit of 
analysis for inferential comparison of performance under different conditions. In an 
eyewitness identification experiment, however, discriminability cannot be calculated at 
the level of the individual participant because any given participant has only one data 
point and those in the signal-present condition never experience the signal-absent 
condition and vice versa.  
The fact that the eyewitness experiences only a single test trial of signal present or 
signal absent raises an important question. Specifically, in an eyewitness identification 
experiment, can we assume that the decision criterion set by an eyewitness who 
encounters a target-present (signal) test trial is the same as the decision criterion set by an 
eyewitness who encounters a target-absent (noise only) test trial? The presumption of 
Signal Detection Theory is that the decision criterion that a decision-maker uses for 
signal-absent test trials is the same as it is for signal-present test trials (e.g., Green & 
Swets, 1966). In the case of a showup (a one-person lineup), for example, the 
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presumption would be that an eyewitness would use the same criterion (i.e., how similar 
to my memory does the suspect need to be for me to identify the person?) if she were 
shown a target-present showup as if she were shown a target-absent showup. In a 
repeated-measures experiment (which often uses initial practice trials) it makes sense that 
a person would settle on a criterion after a few test trials and stay with that criterion 
across remaining trials whether the signal is present or absent. But, we argue, in a single-
trial test we cannot assume that those who were given a target-absent test used the same 
decision criterion as those who were given a target-present test.  
In fact, there are various forms of evidence in basic cognitive psychology that 
suggest that eyewitnesses who encounter a target-absent test will use a lower criterion 
than will eyewitnesses who encounter a target-present test. In word-memory experiments, 
for example, participants will lower their decision criterion when they are tested on word 
blocks for which they have difficulty selecting a signal due to having had fewer study 
trials on the words used in that test block (e.g., Verde & Rotello, 2007). Similarly, 
researchers have noted that the so-called strength-based mirror effect, in which conditions 
that weaken participants’ memory experience lead to not only fewer hits but also more 
false alarms, is due to people responding to the difficulty of detecting signal by lowering 
their decision criterion in order to avoid missing a hit (Wixted & Gaitan, 2002). Hence, as 
the memory task becomes more difficult (weaker sense of a recognition signal), people 
lower their decision criterion. Lowering decision criteria when the memory task becomes 
more difficult is not just true for word memory experiments but also for eyewitness 
identification experiments. For example, exposure duration (Memon, Hope, & Bull, 
2003), distance at encoding (Lampinen, Erickson, Moore, & Hittson, 2014), and disguise 
PRESENT/ABSENT CRITERIA DISCREPANCY 8 
(Mansour, Beaudry, Bertrand, Kalmet, Melsom, & Lindsay, 2012) affect eyewitnesses’ 
decision criteria. In each case, the condition associated with less optimal encoding 
conditions (shorter exposure, greater distance at encoding, a disguised target) results in 
eyewitnesses using lower decision criteria.  This lowering of decision criterion in the face 
of difficult recognition tasks occurs not only when the difficulty manipulation occurs at 
encoding conditions but also when the difficulty manipulation occurs at the time of the 
recognition test (Hintzman, Caulton, & Curran, 1994).   
Clearly, when an eyewitness encounters a target-absent identification procedure 
(innocent suspect) the eyewitness will experience more difficulty detecting the signal 
than when the eyewitness encounters a target-present (guilty suspect) procedure. Indeed, 
in the target-absent procedure, there is no signal to detect. Yet, if eyewitnesses assume 
that this is their only opportunity to identify the culprit, difficulty in a culprit-absent 
condition might lead them to lower their criterion in order to make sure they have a 
chance to make a hit. Of course, eyewitnesses do not drop their criterion because they 
think they are in a culprit-absent condition. All the eyewitnesses know is that they are 
having a weak recognition experience and it is their task to determine the cause of the 
weak recognition experience. To the extent that eyewitnesses misattribute the weak 
recognition experience to something other than the absence of the culprit (e.g., to a poor 
view or to having paid little attention), eyewitnesses might drop their criterion and 
mistakenly identify an innocent person. In fact, research shows that after viewing a 
simulated crime, witnesses who view a randomly-assigned culprit-absent lineup report 
having had a worse view and having paid less attention than do witnesses who view a 
randomly-assigned culprit-present lineup (Bradfield, Wells, & Olson, 2002). In other 
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words, culprit-absent witnesses tend to misattribute their difficulty in detecting the culprit 
in the lineup to having had a poor witnessing view and having not paid much attention at 
the time of witnessing rather than attributing their difficulty to the fact that they had been 
randomly assigned to a culprit-absent lineup. But these metacognitions were incorrect – 
those randomly assigned to culprit-present versus culprit-absent lineups had the same 
view and on average paid the same amount of attention. The work of Palmer, Brewer, and 
Weber (2010) has shown the important role that these metacognitions can play in the 
processes by which eyewitnesses make their identification decisions.   
Our theory posits that there is a propensity for eyewitnesses to set a lower 
decision criterion when they encounter a culprit-absent procedure than when they 
encounter a culprit-present procedure just as people in other tasks set a lower decision 
criterion when the signal is difficult to detect due to weak memories. In both cases, the 
reason they do this is because they fear missing the opportunity to get a hit. Indeed, when 
signal strength weakens it is necessary to lower ones decision criterion in order to avoid 
too many misses. But if this weak signal and task difficulty is due to the fact that the 
culprit is absent from the identification procedure, then lowering the decision criterion 
does not increase hits and instead purely increases false alarms. This setting of a lower 
decision criterion for a target-absent identification procedure than for a target-present 
identification procedure is what we call present/absent criteria discrepancy.  
Importantly, present-absent criteria discrepancy has the effect of profoundly 
undermining memory performance. Whether the decision criterion is high or low, 
applying the same criterion to both the absent and present conditions will produce better 
performance than will setting a lower criterion for absent conditions than for present 
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conditions. Setting a lower decision criterion for culprit-absent conditions than for 
culprit-present conditions is extremely damaging to overall performance. Consider the 
probability of occurrence curves in Panels A and B of Figure 1, for example. The black 
curves reflect the range of match-to-memory values that eyewitnesses who encounter the 
culprit might have and the grey curves reflect the range of match-to-memory values that 
eyewitnesses who encounter innocent suspects might have. Because the culprit will tend 
to provide a better match-to-memory than will an innocent suspect, the black distribution 
exceeds the grey distribution. Discriminability is reflected by the degree of overlap 
between the culprit and innocent distributions and is identical in Panels A and B. In Panel 
A, the single black vertical line reflects the decision criterion. If the suspect’s match 
value exceeds this criterion, the eyewitness makes an ID. If not, the eyewitness rejects. 
But, if eyewitnesses who encounter culprit-absent procedures tend to use more lenient 
criteria than eyewitnesses who encounter culprit-present procedures, then we need a 
second, lower criterion, for eyewitnesses in the culprit-absent condition. The grey vertical 
line in Panel B reflects this lower criterion. The result of using a lower criterion in 
culprit-absent than in culprit-present conditions is an increase in false positives without a 
concomitant increase in hits and, as a result, much poorer performance overall.  
This brings us back to the debate about whether instructions can improve 
discriminability as measured by signal-detection statistics such as the AUC or d΄. We 
agree with Clark (2005) that if the decision criterion is the same in culprit-present and 
culprit-absent procedures, instructions should not improve discriminability (the distance 
between the innocent and guilty suspects distributions in Figure 1) and instead should 
only affect criterion placement. But, what if witnesses tend to set a lower criterion when 
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the culprit is absent than when the culprit is present and there was an instruction that 
mitigated the propensity of witnesses to set a lower criterion when the culprit is absent? If 
there were an instruction that lessened the propensity to set a lower criterion in the absent 
than in the present conditions, then the tradeoff between culprit and innocent suspect 
identifications as measured by the AUC or d΄ could be improved without changing the 
distance between innocent and guilty suspect distributions.  
The key to fashioning such an instruction requires an understanding of why 
witnesses set a lower criterion for culprit-absent identification procedures in the first 
place. We noted earlier that when witnesses encounter a culprit-absent identification 
procedure, they experience a weak match-to-memory sensation. Some witnesses will 
accurately attribute this to the fact that the culprit is absent, but many will misattribute the 
weak sense of match to other things, such as their attention and view having been weak 
(see Bradfield et al., 2002). Accordingly, these witnesses will lower their decision 
criterion in order to not miss what they believe to be their only chance to identify the 
culprit. Our account parallels the accounts that others have used to explain why people in 
word-memory experiments lower their criterion when their memories are weak (e.g., 
Morrell, Gaitan, & Wixted, 2002; Wixted & Gaitan, 2002).  
In our attempt to devise an instruction that would mitigate the tendency of 
witnesses to lower their criterion in the absent condition while having little effect on 
criterion setting in the present condition, we told half of our witnesses that if they did not 
think the culprit was in the showup, they would have an additional opportunity to view 
someone else later. If witnesses in culprit-absent conditions are setting a low criterion 
because they do not want to miss the opportunity to identify the culprit, this instruction 
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should mitigate that tendency. After all, the additional-opportunities instruction helps 
witnesses realize that lowering their criteria so as to choose a person in the first procedure 
might actually prevent them from hitting on the actual culprit in a later identification 
procedure. Hence, this instruction should reduce mistaken identifications in culprit-absent 
conditions. At the same time, however, this additional-opportunities instruction should 
have less impact on culprit identifications. Indeed, the instruction is targeted at 
eyewitnesses who are having a relatively weak match-to-memory experience, but choose 
to make an identification out of concern that this is their only opportunity to identify the 
culprit. On average, eyewitnesses who are viewing a culprit should have a stronger 
match-to-memory experience and so fewer culprit identifications than innocent-suspect 
identifications should be attributable to the eyewitness’ fear that this is the only 
opportunity to identify the culprit.  
Method 
The Institutional Review Board for human research at Iowa State University 
approved this experiment. 
Participants and Design. We recruited undergraduates (N = 610) from the Psychology 
Participant Pool at Iowa State University in exchange for course credit. Participants, on 
average, were 19.23 (SD = 1.82) years of age and 64% were female. The majority of 
participants were of European ancestry: European (79.34%), Hispanic (3.77%), Asian or 
Pacific Islander (9.18%), Black (2.46%), and “Other” (5.25%).  
Participants were randomly assigned to a 2 (may-or-may-not admonition: no, yes) 
× 2 (additional-opportunities instruction: no, yes) × 2 (Showup: target absent, target 
present) between-subjects design. We also examined performance in iterative-showup 
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procedures. Replicating Smith et al. (2014), we found that cautionary instructions 
reduced innocent suspect identifications for iterative-showup procedures. But, all of the 
action from the additional-opportunities instruction occurred on the first showup, so we 
do not discuss iterative-showups further. Interested readers are referred to the 
supplementary materials.  
Materials. 
Targets.  Each participant was presented with only a single target video; however, 
we used three different targets in this study to attain some limited degree of stimulus 
sampling (Wells & Windschitl, 1999).  Each target was yoked to three innocent suspects 
who each fit the general description of their respective target.  All targets and respective 
innocents were male, European, in their early 20s, and varied in hair length and color 
(very short, light brown hair; medium-length, very dark hair; medium-length blonde 
hair). None of our outcome measures varied as a function of stimuli; therefore, we do not 
differentiate among them in our analyses.   
Each target video lasted approximately 2s in duration, depicted the target’s face 
from a three-quarter angle, and included a brief statement from the target related to 
criminal activity (e.g., “So, there’s good stuff in that place?”). Each video was 
approximately 18 cm × 25 cm.  In each showup photo, the face of the suspect was 
depicted from the neck up (no clothing cues) looking directly at the camera. Each 
photograph was approximately 22 cm x 28 cm. The choosing pattern did not vary as a 
function of target stimuli, so we do not make any further distinctions among these 
stimuli.  
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Filler task. After the encoding task, participants provided informed consent, 
completed a demographics questionnaire, completed the self-monitoring scale (Snyder, 
1974) for an unrelated study, and completed a visual search task involving a beach scene 
from the children’s book, “Where’s Waldo?”.1 Participants were given a sheet of paper 
with a list of questions regarding the image, such as “How many people in the picture are 
in red swimsuits?” The visual search task lasted eight minutes and in total, there was an 
approximately 10-minute delay between the encoding video and the initial showup 
procedure.  
Procedure.  Participants were brought into a room, individually, and instructed to 
watch a video on a computer. Following the video, participants read a letter of 
information on screen, gave consent, and provided demographic information. After 
providing demographic information, participants completed the self-monitoring scale 
(Snyder, 1974) and completed the visual search task.  The delay between encoding and 
recognition was approximately 10 minutes.  
Participants who received neither the standard admonition nor the additional-
opportunities instruction were told: “In a moment you will view a photo of a man. Please 
indicate whether the man in the photo is the man from the video you saw at the beginning 
of the experimental session.” Participants received the standard admonition were also 
instructed that the photo may or may not be of the man from the video. Participants who 
received the additional-opportunities instruction were also told that “If you do not believe 
that the man in the photo is the man you saw, others will be shown later for you to 
attempt to identify the man from the video.” After their identification decisions, 
1 TM & © 2008 Entertainment Rights Distribution Limited. All rights reserved. 
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participants were asked to indicate their level of confidence from 0% - 100% (in 10-point 
increments). 
Results 
In our primary analysis we regressed choosing on the additional-opportunities 
instruction, the standard admonition, and target presence. We followed up significant 
interactions by examining simple-main effects within target-present and -absent 
conditions. Significant interactions indicate a better tradeoff between culprit and innocent 
suspect identifications and main effects indicate more conservative responding. Keeping 
with traditional practice in eyewitness research, we compute likelihood ratios to assess 
the diagnosticity of identification decisions (Wells & Lindsay, 1980). Because some 
researchers have recently advocated for the exclusive use of ROC analysis to compare 
identification procedures, we also constructed ROC curves (e.g., Wixted & Mickes, 
2012). We conclude by examining the predictive value of expressed level of eyewitness 
confidence with both a model-building approach and calibration analysis. ROC analyses 
were generated using the pROC statistical package (Robin et al., 2011) and all statistical 
analyses were based on the nonparametric bootstrapping method (n = 2000).  
For some of our key descriptive statistics, we were only able to obtain a point 
estimate for each condition and had no ability to assess the variance around these 
statistics (e.g., the diagnosticity ratio, calibration statistics). For the diagnosticity ratio we 
used a Monte Carlo simulation to calculate the probability of observing a difference of 
equal or greater magnitude if the null were true. For the calibration statistics, we use the 
modified-jackknife procedure described by Horry, Palmer, and Brewer (2012). We used 
the jackknife procedure to estimate the standard error for each statistic (Mosteller & 
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Tukey, 1968) and then we used these estimated standard errors to calculate inferential 
95% confidence intervals (CIs) around each statistic (Tryon, 2001). Non-overlapping 
inferential CIs indicate significance at the α = .05 level.  
Comparing Culprit and Innocent Suspect Identifications with Logistic 
Regression Analysis. The three-way interaction between the additional-opportunities 
instruction, the standard admonition, and target-presence was not significant, B = -.13, SE 
= .74, Wald’s χ2(1) = 0.03, p = .86, eB = 0.88, (95% CI [0.21, 3.73]). Neither the two-way 
interaction between the standard admonition and target-presence, B = -.13, SE = .36, 
Wald’s χ2(1) = 0.12, p = .73, eB = 0.88, (95% CI [0.43, 1.80]), nor the main effect of the 
standard admonition, B = -.11, SE = .18, Wald’s χ2(1) = 0.39, p = .53, eB = 0.90, (95% CI 
[0.64, 1.27]) were significant. The standard admonition neither impacted the tradeoff 
between culprit and innocent suspect identifications nor the frequency with which 
eyewitnesses identified suspects. Accordingly, we do not consider the standard 
admonition further.  
In contrast to the standard admonition, the additional-opportunities instruction 
decreased the frequency with which eyewitnesses identified suspects, B = -.57, SE = .18, 
Wald’s χ2(1) = 10.47, p = .001 eB = 0.56, (95% CI [0.40, 0.80]). Participants who were 
provided with the additional-opportunities instruction (0.49:1) were 44% (.56 – 1 = -
44%) less likely to identify the suspect than were those participants who did not receive 
the AOI (0.83:1). In other words, the additional-opportunities instruction produced a 
conservative shift in response bias. Importantly, this main effect was qualified by a 
significant interaction between the additional-opportunities instruction and target-
presence, B = .85, SE = .37, Wald’s χ2(1) = 5.27, p = .02, eB = 2.33, (95% CI [1.13, 
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4.79]). The additional-opportunities instruction significantly decreased innocent suspect 
identifications, B = -1.08, SE = .29, Wald’s χ2(1) = 14.00, p <.001, eB = 0.34, (95% CI 
[0.19, 0.60]), but did not significantly decrease culprit identifications, B = -.23, SE = .23, 
Wald΄s χ2(1) = 1.01, p = .32, eB = 0.79, (95% CI [.51, 1.25]). Participants who received 
the AOI (P = .15, Odds = 0.17:1) were 66% (.34 – 1 = -66%) less likely to identify the 
innocent suspect than were those participants who did not receive the additional-
opportunities instruction (P = .33, Odds = 0.50:1). Hence, the additional-opportunities 
instruction produced a better tradeoff between culprit and innocent-suspect 
identifications. All proportions are provided in Table 1.  
The Diagnosticity Ratio. Next we examined the impact of the additional-
opportunities instruction on the diagnosticity ratio. Because the underlying distributions 
for ratio-based measures inherently suffer from positive skew, we log transformed the 
respective diagnosticity ratios and inferentially compared the log-likelihoods. This is 
analogous to the process employed when using logistic regression analysis, for which the 
log-odds are subjected to the inferential test before being exponentiated back into an odds 
ratio to make interpretation more intuitive. Suspect identifications made in the presence 
of the additional-opportunities instruction were more diagnostic (diagnosticity ratio = 
3.52) than were suspect identifications made in the absence of the additional-
opportunities instruction (diagnosticity ratio = 1.71), p < .001. 
ROC Analysis. We next examined the additional-opportunities instruction with 
ROC analysis. For identification procedures, ROC curves are constructed by plotting 
culprit identifications against innocent suspect identifications at cumulating levels of 
confidence. The leftmost-point of the ROC curve represents culprit and innocent suspect 
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identifications made with 100% confidence. The second to leftmost point on the ROC 
curve represents all of those identifications from the first point (viz. identifications made 
with 100% confidence) plus all identifications made with 90% confidence. One continues 
plotting points in this manner until all identifications are represented in the rightmost 
point of the ROC curve. When comparing two ROC curves (as we will do below), the 
procedure that produces a higher ROC curve is the procedure that produces a better 
tradeoff between culprit and innocent-suspect identifications. 
Because we examined showups in the present experiment, we also included 
eyewitnesses who made rejections in our ROC curves. This is how ROC curves are 
typically constructed in the basic memory literature and the result is an ROC curve that 
covers the entire unit square (e.g., Macmillan & Creelman, 2005). The procedure works 
like this: after all of the choosers (even those who made an identification with 0% 
confidence) are reflected in a single point on the ROC curve, the next point includes all 
of the choosers and the eyewitnesses who rejected the suspect with 0% confidence. At 
the applied level, one could interpret this as meaning that, if the eyewitness rejected the 
suspect, but had 0% confidence in that rejection, police might be willing to treat that as 
an identification instead of a rejection. One continues cumulating points in this manner 
until all eyewitness-participants (including those who rejected the suspect with 100% 
confidence) are represented in the rightmost point of the ROC curve, which will fall on 
the Northeast corner of the unit square (X = 1, Y = 1).  
Our ROC curves are depicted in Figure 2. We first compared the ROC curves 
considering all eyewitness decisions, including rejections. Although the additional-
opportunities instruction produced a descriptively larger AUC (.74) than the control 
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condition (AUC = .70), the difference was not statistically reliable, D = 1.02, p = .31. 
But, when ROC curves intersect (as ours do) or when there is an a priori reason to 
examine only a portion of the unit square (e.g., consider only suspect identifications), 
examining partial AUCs makes good sense (McClish, 1989; Zhou, O’Malley, & Mauri, 
2007). We first examined a pAUC region that included all suspect identifications. 
Because the highest innocent suspect identification rate was .33, we examined the pAUC 
region of 0 - .34. In this region of the ROC space, the expected difference emerged: 
identifications made in the presence of the additional-opportunities instruction were more 
diagnostic (pAUC = .17) than identifications made in the absence of the additional-
opportunities instruction (pAUC = .12), D = 2.21, p = .03. We also compared the two 
ROC curves in a more restricted pAUC range that extended only to the innocent-suspect 
identification rate in the presence of the AOI (pAUC: 0 - .15) and again, identifications 
made in the presence of the additional-opportunities instruction were more diagnostic 
(pAUC = .06) than identifications made in the absence of the additional-opportunities 
instruction (pAUC = .03), D = 2.75, p = .006. This is a particularly promising sign for the 
additional-opportunities instruction, because in this portion of the unit square, all 
eyewitnesses who made suspect identifications in the presence of the additional-
opportunities instruction (even those who did so at the lowest levels of confidence) are 
being compared to only the most confident eyewitnesses from the control condition (70% 
- 100% confidence).  
Eyewitness Confidence. Next, we examined how well eyewitness confidence 
sorted accurate and inaccurate choosers and non-choosers. See Table 2 for mean 
confidence as a function of choosing, accuracy, and the additional-opportunities 
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instruction. Table 2 also includes point-biserial correlation coefficients for the 
relationship between confidence and accuracy as a function of choosing and the 
additional-opportunities instruction.  
Confidence-Accuracy Calibration.  Calibration curves involve plotting the 
percent of accurate decisions at some expressed level of confidence (objective accuracy) 
against that expressed level of confidence (subjective accuracy) (e.g., Brewer & Wells, 
2006; Cutler & Penrod, 1989; Juslin Olsson, & Winman, 1996; Wixted & Wells, 2017). 
Perfect calibration occurs when 100% of decisions that are made with 100% confidence 
are correct, 90% of decisions made with 90% confidence are correct, and so on and so 
forth. We generated calibration curves to compare the confidence-accuracy relationship 
for choosers and non-choosers as a function of the additional-opportunities instruction. 
Because calibration curves require a large number of data points, we collapsed the 
confidence scale into a four-point scale: 0% - 40%, 50% - 60%, 70% - 80%, 90% - 100%. 
We also calculated three complimentary statistics: calibration (C), over/underconfidence 
(O/U), and the normalized resolution index (NRI). The C statistic ranges from 0 (perfect 
calibration) to 1 and measures the extent to which expressed confidence deviates from 
accuracy. The O/U statistic varies from -1 (underconfidence) to +1 (overconfidence), 
with negative values indicating that the probability an eyewitness was correct exceeded 
his or her expressed level of confidence and positive values indicating that the 
eyewitness’ expressed level of confidence exceeded the probability that he or she was 
correct. Finally, the NRI statistic ranges from 0 (no discrimination) to 1 (perfect 
discrimination) and indicates how well confidence discriminates accurate from inaccurate 
eyewitnesses (See Brewer & Wells, 2006). 
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Figure 3 shows our calibration curves for choosers (top panel) and non-choosers 
(bottom panel) as a function of the additional-opportunities instruction and we present the 
complimentary calibration statistics (C, O/U, and NRI) in Table 3. There are a couple of 
noteworthy points that can be taken from Figure 3 and Table 3. First, replicating past 
research (e.g., Brewer & Wells, 2006; Wixted & Wells, 2017), confidence-accuracy 
calibration was generally good. This is evidenced by the positive slope of the calibration 
curves – which follow the ideal function (the diagonal line) quite closely – and by the fact 
that the identification procedures produce calibration statistics near zero (lower bound 
95% CIs of .00). The one exception to this rule, non-choosers who received the 
additional-opportunities instruction were significantly less calibrated than non-choosers 
who did not receive the additional-opportunities instruction. The generally poor 
calibration for these participant-eyewitnesses is also evidenced by the lack of slope in the 
calibration curve. Moreover, the NRI statistic for these participant-eyewitnesses 
overlapped zero, indicating that confidence did not significantly discriminate between 
accurate and inaccurate non-choosers who received the additional-opportunities 
instruction. 
The second noteworthy point coming from the calibration analysis – eyewitness-
participants who received the additional-opportunities instruction and made an 
identification were generally underconfident (the upper-bound of the 95% CI for the O/U 
statistic fell below zero) and more underconfident than eyewitness-participants who made 
an identification in the absence of the additional-opportunities instruction (the 95% CIs 
for the O/U statistics did not overlap). This means that, across confidence levels, 
eyewitnesses who made an identification in the presence of the additional-opportunities 
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instruction were more likely to be correct than eyewitnesses who made an identification 
in the absence of the additional-opportunities instruction. This is also evident from the 
fact that the standard errors in the calibration plot are non-overlapping at all but the 
lowest levels of confidence.  
Logistic Regression. Calibration analysis is a nice tool for assessing the 
confidence-accuracy relationship, but it leaves something to be desired at the applied 
level. Indeed, it would be ideal if we could specify by how much the odds of an accurate 
identification increase with each unit increase in confidence. By using confidence as a 
predictor in a logistic regression model, we can answer precisely this question. With each 
unit increase in expressed level of confidence, the odds that the identified suspect was the 
culprit increased 1.41 times, B = .34, SE = .08, Wald’s χ2(1) = 19.70, p < .001, eB = 1.41, 
(95% CI [1.21, 1.63]); but, the predictive utility of eyewitness confidence did not differ 
as a function of the additional-opportunities instruction, B = .08, SE = .16, Wald’s χ2(1) = 
.27, p = .61, eB = 1.09 (95% CI [0.79, 1.49]). Likewise, with each unit increase in 
expressed level of confidence, the odds that the rejected suspect was the culprit decreased 
1.21 times, B = .19, SE = .05, Wald’s χ2(1) = 14.75, p < .001, eB = 1.21 (95% CI [1.10, 
1.33]); however, this effect was qualified by a trending interaction term, B = -.18, SE = 
.10, Wald’s χ2(1) = 3.17, p = .08, eB = 0.83 (95% CI [0.68, 1.02]). Specifically, when 
participants were not provided with the additional-opportunities instruction, the odds that 
the suspect was innocent given a rejection increased 1.35 times with each unit increase in 
confidence, B = .30, SE = .08, Wald’s χ2(1) = 13.82, p <.001, eB = 1.35 (95% CI [1.15, 
1.57]). But, in the presence of the additional-opportunities instruction, confidence was a 
more modest predictor of accuracy for non-choosers; with each unit increase in 
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confidence the odds that the suspect was innocent given a rejection increased by only 
1.12 times, B = .12, SE = .06, Wald’s χ2(1) = 3.24, p = .07, eB = 1.12 (95% CI [.99, 
1.27]). This triangulates with the findings of our confidence-accuracy calibration analysis 
– in the presence of the additional-opportunities instruction the confidence levels
expressed by non-choosers neither significantly calibrated with accuracy nor did they 
significantly discriminate between accurate and inaccurate non-choosers. 
Discussion 
As predicted at the outset of this paper, the additional-opportunities instruction 
decreased innocent suspect identifications to a greater extent than culprit identifications. 
We found no evidence that the standard may-or-may-not admonition has any efficacy in 
showup procedures. This is likely due to the fact that it is inherent in a showup procedure 
(but not necessarily in a lineup procedure) that the suspect may-or-may-not be the culprit. 
In addition, we found evidence of confidence-accuracy calibration for eyewitness 
identifications from showup procedures (cf. Key, Cash, Neuschatz, Price, Wetmore, & 
Gronlund, 2015). Confidence-accuracy calibration was less impressive among 
eyewitnesses who rejected suspects. 
Applied Implications and Recommendations 
The most important finding of the present research was that the additional-
opportunities instruction reduced innocent-suspect identifications to a greater extent than 
culprit identifications. Although more research is necessary before deriving firm policy 
recommendations, this instruction potentially has widespread application. We found a 
large benefit of the additional opportunities instruction with only a slight cost. Based on 
an earlier conference presentation of the current work, Eisen, Smith, Olaguez, Skerritt-
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Perta  (2017, Experiment 3) also examined the additional-opportunities instruction. The 
Eisen et al. experiment was a field study with low statistical power and so the interaction 
between culprit-presence and the additional-opportunities instruction did not reach 
statistical significance. Nevertheless, the additional-opportunities instruction decreased 
innocent-suspect identifications from 40% to 17%, but only decreased culprit 
identifications from 75% to 69%. 
A limitation of the present experiment is the language used in the additional-
opportunities instruction. We assured participants that if they did not believe the suspect 
was the culprit, they would have additional opportunities to make an identification later. 
We used this language because we permitted eyewitnesses to view additional showups if 
they did not make an identification from the first showup. But, it is clear that in the real 
world, police officers would need to use more tentative language and instruct 
eyewitnesses that they might have additional opportunities to make an identification later. 
Eisen et al. (2017) used more tentative language in their additional-opportunities 
instruction (i.e., might have additional opportunities) and although the interaction 
between culprit presence and the additional-opportunities instruction was non-significant, 
the raw effect size was larger than what we found in the present manuscript. In any case, 
before making any firm policy recommendations, future research will need to address this 
issue and ensure that a more tentative instruction indicating that eyewitnesses might have 
additional opportunities has the same benefits as the instruction used in the present paper.  
Theoretical Implications 
The primary theoretical contribution of the current work is the demonstration that 
cautionary instructions can produce a better tradeoff between culprit and innocent-suspect 
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identifications. Further, we believe our present/absent criteria discrepancy 
conceptualization offers a fresh look at performance in eyewitness identification 
procedures. We are certainly not the first to suggest that eyewitnesses who encounter 
innocent suspects tend to behave differently than do eyewitness who encounter guilty 
suspects. Indeed, more than 30 years ago, Wells (1984, 1993) distinguished between 
absolute and relative judgments in an attempt to explain discrepancies between 
eyewitnesses in culprit-present and culprit-absent procedures. More recently, Charman et 
al. (2010) used the Selective Cue Integration Framework to explain why eyewitnesses 
who identify innocent suspects are more susceptible to post-identification feedback. We 
are also by no means the first to use Signal Detection Theory to explain eyewitness 
decision-making (e.g., Clark, 2003, 2005). But as far as we can tell, this is the first 
attempt to reconcile the dual-process conceptualization with signal-detection based 
models in the eyewitness literature. The result is a theory that predicts discrepant criteria 
between culprit-present and –absent eyewitnesses due to strength differences in the 
match-to-memory experience (See Wixted & Mickes, 2010 for a similar endeavor in the 
basic memory literature).  
The Congruent-Criteria Model. As we have noted throughout this manuscript, a classic 
assumption of Signal Detection Theory is that the same criteria are applied on both 
culprit-absent and culprit-present procedures (Green & Swets, 1966; Macmillan & 
Creelman, 2005). We call this the congruent-criteria model. Within the framework of this 
model, the only way the additional-opportunities instruction could have decreased 
innocent-suspect identifications to a greater extent than culprit identifications is by 
increasing discriminability (i.e., decreasing the overlap between the culprit and innocent 
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distributions in Figure 1). Could the additional-opportunities instruction have increased 
discriminability? Perhaps, but we can think of no plausible psychological process by 
which the additional-opportunities instruction would have done so. Moreover, SDT is 
also quite clear in its prediction that conservative instructions (e.g., the additional-
opportunities instruction) should impact only criterion setting and not discriminability 
(Green & Swets, 1966; Macmillan & Creelman, 2005). Thus, there seems little reason to 
infer from a higher ROC curve that the additional-opportunities instruction increased 
discriminability or memory strength.  
The Discrepant-Criteria Model. Our alternative model posits that the criteria 
used by participants who encounter an innocent suspect are lower than the criteria used 
by participants who encounter a culprit for reasons we have already discussed. Figure 1 
provides the discrepant-criteria explanation for the additional-opportunities effect found 
in the present paper. Discriminability is equivalent in Panels A and B of Figure 1. But, 
Panel B displays the tendency of eyewitnesses who encounter innocent suspects to use 
more lenient criteria than eyewitnesses who encounter guilty suspects. The result is an 
increase in false alarms without a concomitant increase in hits and worse overall 
performance. In Panel A there is only one decision criterion that is common to both 
eyewitnesses who encounter innocent suspects and eyewitnesses who encounter guilty 
suspects. Indeed, it is our contention that the additional-opportunities instruction 
eliminates (or greatly decreases) the tendency for eyewitnesses who encounter innocent 
suspects to respond to the relatively weak match-to-memory by lowering their criteria for 
making an identification. The result is that the additional-opportunities instruction leads 
to a better tradeoff between culprit and innocent suspect identifications.  
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Limitations and Future Directions 
The additional-opportunities instruction data we obtained are consistent with the 
discrepant-criteria hypothesis. But there are other theoretical explanations that could also 
explain this pattern of results. While we do not believe there is any reason to think that 
the additional-opportunities instruction increased discriminability, we cannot rule out that 
possibility. It is also possible that a criterial variance model could explain the additional-
opportunities instruction effect. Criterial variance refers to the fact that there is variance 
in where eyewitnesses set their decision criteria (Smith, et al., 2017). As variance in 
criteria-setting decreases, performance will increase. A model that proposes a reduction 
in criterial variance could fit the data in the present paper. However, we can think of no 
mechanism by which the additional-opportunities instruction would reduce criterial 
variance. Maybe the additional-opportunities instruction does reduce criterial variance. 
But at this point we are at a loss to come up with a plausible psychological process that 
would lead us to expect this to happen. Accordingly, we favor the hypothesis that the 
additional-opportunities instruction improves performance via helping to prevent 
witnesses in culprit-absent conditions from setting a low criterion.  
Although cautionary instructions have been examined with lineups (See Steblay, 
2013), this is one of few studies to examine cautionary instructions with showup 
procedures (e.g., Eisen et al., 2017; Smith et al., 2014). This is an important step for the 
field’s understanding of how instructions work. Unlike lineups, showups do not include 
fillers and thus, make sorting between discriminability and response bias much more 
straightforward. Showups offer an important playing field for assessing the assumptions 
of Signal Detection Theory in the eyewitness context and for developing a better 
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theoretical understanding of how many variables impact eyewitness decision-making. 
Furthermore, additional research is needed to inform stakeholders on the best-practice 
recommendations for conducting showup procedures. The present work contributes to a 
small body of research on that topic.  
Because we only used showups, we cannot be certain whether the additional-
opportunities instruction effect is unique to showups or whether the same effect would 
also be observed with lineups. From a theoretical perspective, we see no reason to assume 
that the additional-opportunities instruction effect would not also apply to lineups. As 
with showups, a culprit-absent lineup produces a weaker match-to-memory relative to a 
culprit-present lineup. Hence, we would expect witnesses to use lower decision criteria 
when they encounter culprit-absent lineups than then they encounter culprit-present 
lineups. In effect, the use of the additional-opportunities instruction with a simultaneous 
lineup could be thought of as a backloaded simultaneous lineup.  
Final Remarks 
The additional-opportunities instruction appears to be a means by which police 
officers might improve performance in showup identification procedures and potentially 
in lineup procedures as well. Law enforcement personnel could use this instruction to 
reduce innocent suspect identifications with little cost to culprit identifications. Indeed, 
before conducting a showup procedure, officers at the Norwood Police Department in 
Massachusetts routinely inform eyewitnesses that they are going to be asked to view 
some people (William G. Brooks, Chief of Police, Norwood Police Department, 
Norwood, Massachusetts, USA, personal communication, March 20, 2015). The 
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sentiment of this instruction is similar to the additional-opportunities instruction and 
results in what is essentially a backloaded showup procedure. 
The present/absent criteria discrepancy conceptualization is our attempt to 
reconcile dual-process and signal-detection approaches to eyewitness identification 
procedures. When researchers apply traditional Signal Detection Theory to the analysis of 
between-participant eyewitness data, the implicit assumption is that culprit-absent 
eyewitnesses construct the same fixed decision criteria as culprit-present eyewitnesses 
and are completely uninfluenced by the identification task (Green & Swets, 1966). This 
assumption runs counter to a large body of research demonstrating that people have a 
tendency to lower their decision criteria when match-to-memory is weak (Lampinen et 
al., 2014; Mansour et al., 2012; Wixted & Gaitan, 2002). Indeed, eyewitnesses who 
encounter culprit-absent procedures will tend to have a weaker match-to-memory 
experience than will eyewitnesses who encounter culprit-present procedures. Presumably, 
the weak match-to-memory experience afforded by a culprit-absent procedure will have 
the same impact as any other weak match-to-memory experience – it will lead 
eyewitnesses to lower their decision criteria. In this sense, eyewitnesses who encounter 
culprit-absent procedures tend to behave differently than eyewitnesses who encounter 
culprit-present procedures. But, this discrepancy between eyewitnesses who encounter 
culprit-absent procedures and eyewitnesses who encounter culprit-present procedures is 
mediated by an underlying strength variable, match-to-memory. Accordingly, we have 
conceptualized present/absent criteria discrepancy as a signal-detection based model.  
In order for an instruction to reduce the discrepancy between the criteria set in the 
culprit-absent versus culprit-present conditions it has to be fashioned in a way that 
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capitalizes on the likely reason for the discrepancy. We tend to agree with Wixted and 
Gaitan (2002) and Morrell et al. (2002) that people lower their criteria when a test item 
produces a low match-to-memory because they do not want to miss an opportunity to get 
a hit on a target. This dovetails with Smith et al.’s (2014) finding with iterative showups 
indicating that witnesses will raise their criterion and make fewer mistaken identifications 
when they are surprised by the appearance of a second showup opportunity and this 
higher criterion perseveres throughout the remaining showups they encounter.  
 The theoretical explanation that we have proffered here might open up new and 
creative ways to improve eyewitness decision-making. There are few interventions we 
can think of that would increase underlying discriminability from identification 
procedures. Indeed, there is nothing law enforcement personnel can do to improve the 
conditions under which an individual witnesses a crime. But, there are many ways in 
which law enforcement personnel might influence response bias. To the extent that there 
is present/absent criteria discrepancy, we believe that it is possible to create new 
manipulations that will differentially impact culprit and innocent suspect identifications 
(as we have done here).  
We believe that the present/absent criteria-discrepancy conceptualization has 
considerable theoretical and applied utility. In particular, the criteria-discrepancy 
conceptualization and the additional-opportunities instruction effect challenges the 
conjecture that system variables (such as instructions) can only produce a benefit of 
reducing mistaken identifications by producing an offsetting cost of reducing accurate 
identifications (Clark, 2005, 2012).  This raises new possibilities for fashioning methods 
that might improve eyewitness identification performance.   
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Tables 
Table 1 










Culprit IDs 58% (77) 56% (79) 54% (74) 49% (76) 
Innocent IDs 34% (77) 33% (76) 15% (75) 14% (76) 
AUC (0 – 1.00) .70 .74 
pAUC (0 - .34) .12 .17 
pAUC (0 - .15) .03 .06 
 Note. Control = control condition; Standard Instruction = may-or-may-not be the culprit; 
Additional Opportunities = the additional opportunities instruction; AUC = area under the curve; 
pAUC = partial area under the curve. Values in parentheses are the number of participants in that 
condition. Because ROC analysis requires a large number of observations, we collapsed the 
additional-opportunities and control conditions over the may-or-may-not instruction for the 
purpose of our ROC analysis.  
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Table 2 
Expressed Level of Confidence for Choosers and Non-Choosers as a Function of Accuracy and 
the Additional-Opportunities Instruction 
Additional Opportunities Control 
M SD M SD 
Choosers 
Accurate 65.8% 10.0% 66.5% 8.84% 
Inaccurate 50.0% 6.33% 54.1% 11.3% 
rpb .33 (p <.001) .29 (p <.001) 
Non-Choosers 
Accurate 66.9% 13.5% 60.7% 11.2% 
Inaccurate 60.7% 13.1% 47.3% 10.9% 
rpb .13 (p = .07) .30 (p <.001) 
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Table 3 
Confidence-Accuracy Calibration for Choosers and Non-Choosers as a Function of the 
Additional-Opportunities Instruction 
Choosers Non-choosers 
95% CIs 95% CIs 
M SE Lower Upper M SE Lower Upper 
C 
Control .01 .01 .00 .02 .01 .01 .00 .02 
AOI .02 .01 .00 .04 .05 .01 .03 .06 
O/U 
Control -.01 .04 -.07 .04 -.05 .04 -.10 .00 
AOI -.15 .04 -.21 -.10 -.09 .04 -.14 -.04 
NRI 
Control .08 .04 .01 .14 .10 .04 .03 .17 
AOI .16 .07 .05 .26 .02 .02 .00 .04 
Note. C = calibration statistic; O/U = over/underconfidence; NRI = normalized resolution index; 
SE = standard error; 95% CIs = 95% confidence intervals; Control = control condition; AOI = 
additional-opportunities instruction. 
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Figure 1. The figure contrasts signal detection representations of the classic congruent-
criteria model with our proposed discrepant-criteria model. In the discrepant-criteria 
model, eyewitnesses who encounter innocent suspects tend to use more lenient criteria 
than do eyewitnesses who encounter culprits. The result is worse performance in Panel B 
than in Panel A where eyewitnesses who encounter innocent suspects use the same 
criteria as eyewitnesses who encounter guilty suspects. 
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Figure 2. AOI = additional-opportunities instruction; Control = control condition; The 
black lines identify the “cut-off” points for the additional-opportunities instruction and 
control conditions, respectively. That is, these lines separate eyewitnesses who identified 
the suspect from those who did not. The increased diagnosticity of identification 
decisions that resulted from the additional-opportunities instruction is evident from 
comparing the distances between these lines. There is only a very small distance between 
these lines on the Y-axis, reflecting the fact that the additional-opportunities instruction 
produced only a small (nonsignificant) decrease in culprit identifications. But, the 
distance between the lines on the X-axis is much larger, reflecting the fact that the 
additional-opportunities instruction dramatically reduced innocent suspect identifications. 
In addition, because ROC curves in the eyewitness literature typically only include 
eyewitnesses who make identifications (and not those who make rejections), we have 
superimposed a chooser-only ROC curve in the above figure. It is evident in both 
representations that eyewitnesses who received the additional-opportunities instruction 
made more diagnostic identifications.  
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Figure 3. AOI = additional-opportunities instruction; Control = control condition; Error 
bars represent standard errors.  
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